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By exploring the nature of scientific representative practices, I shall define a methodology that relates the use of 
symmetry to specific practical functions. In order to expound this approach, I shall investigate the role played by the 
conception of symmetry in representative practices from a philosophical and epistemological perspective. The paper 
proceeds as follows. In the first part, I introduce the reasons why our conception of representative practices should 
consider the aims and the objectives towards which they direct their interest. Secondly, by using symmetry as a case 
study, I try to show that philosophy can find fruitful pathways of interaction with sciences, as it is the case when it deals 
with the practical implications of the employment of symmetry in modeling. In the third section of the paper I shall 
refer to other examples that highlight the use of symmetry in scientific representative practices. I shall conclude with 
some remarks on the implications that this approach involves in epistemology, especially on our conception of 
objectivity and symmetry. 
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Introduction 
 
“The most important lesson that we have learned in this century is that the secret of nature is 
symmetry”. With this statement D. Gross (1999, p. 57) echoed the method that Hermann Weyl 
advanced in Symmetry (1952).  Weyl firmly believed that our a priori statements in physics are 
grounded on symmetry. And he was profoundly right in his claim. Nevertheless, the fact that 
symmetry can act as a canon in informing scientific theories and models, does not prove that the 
secret of nature is symmetry. It is widely acknowledged that there are different symmetries not only 
in physics, but also in other sciences. What we call “symmetry” hides a rich variety (we talk about 
symmetries in plural), a multiplicity of different possible operations that inform our current 
scientific theories and practices. For this specific reason symmetry is a suitable case study in order 
to reflect on scientific representative practices in general. But this is not the whole story. Weyl 
proposed to refer geometrical symmetry (bilateral and rotational symmetries) to certain operations 
that can be detected in both scientific and artistic representative practices: “Symmetry, as wide or as 
narrow as you may define its meaning, is one idea by which man through the ages has tried to 
comprehend and create order, beauty and perfection” (Weyl 1952, p. 5). The fact that we appeal to 
symmetry in different fields means that there are different representative practices that can employ 
analogous operations. If we take symmetry as being one of those operations unifying our 
methodology in different practices, we might discover that symmetry ceases to be a “secret of 
nature”; rather it appears as a truth or a canon of representative practices. 
By illustrating the history of symmetry, it is possible to investigate a wide range of 
representative practices in different sciences, as well as different methodologies at stake in the use 
of symmetries. In dealing with the assessment of Weyl’s approach, we specify the purposes and the 
aims underlying the choice of representing organic and inorganic processes by means of certain 
symmetries. Therefore the most natural question that enters into this picture concerns the status of 
symmetries and their reification in the world.  
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Do symmetries correspond to actual processes in nature? If we follow upon Gross, we are 
tempted to agree with this. However, Weyl also held a slightly different opinion. Symmetry 
(specifically in physics) does not correspond to the secret that nature is hiding; rather it appears to 
be one of the most powerful operations to order the interactions produced by processes that we are 
still trying to determine and clarify.1
 
 Nevertheless, it must be conceded that there is an analogy 
between the result of the interactions and the operations that we perform: this analogy rests on the 
ground of the operation of mapping the unity of the system under analysis according to an 
automorphism. However, it is not sufficient just to put certain constraints to the abovementioned 
question and restrict the possible kinds of symmetries that could find a correspondence in the actual 
world. There are elements in the scientific representative practices that allow the acquisition of the 
correspondence, even if it is just in terms of approximation, for instance, between model-systems 
and target-systems, as well as between mathematical models and actual interactions. In order to 
assess the nature of these elements, we must look at what scientists do when using symmetries, 
namely at the aims that are at stake in scientific representative practices. The fruitfulness of this 
approach lies on the fact that in our specific case study we detect the unifying role of symmetries, 
according to certain practical functions, and we encompass phenomena into a system of principles 
and rules aiming at the unity of their representation. The point that must be highlighted here is that 
these principles and rules are chosen according to aims, objectives, and criteria of unification that fit 
the unity of the processes under analysis (we certainly find more than mere denotation in the 
engineering model of a bridge performed according to robustness criteria and in general in all 
performance-based models that aim at explaining phenomena such as failure, cracks, and so forth). 
In other words, a change of perspective is in order and the question we ask must be changed. Our 
conceptions of representation and correspondence in the current debate are to be re-shaped. This 
aspect is clarified in the next section and it is the starting point of our reflections. 
Part I: Representation or representative practices? 
 
Why should we talk about representative practices instead of representation? Why should 
our conception of representative practices consider the aims and the objectives towards which they 
direct their interest? These are questions that can be rightly asked at the very beginning of our 
reasoning. 
The expression ‘representative practices’ might recall Sorrell’s (2004) or Lynch and 
Woolgar’s (1990) works, but the present perspective does not approach the subject sociologically or 
from a Peircean standpoint, even though it recognizes the framework of the social human activity 
that informs scientific or artistic representative practices. My claim is that the aims and the 
objectives pertaining to these practices that cannot be isolated from the use of certain model-
systems and practical functions. These aims and objectives are part of the model-systems, because 
in informing them they allow the “acquisition of the correspondence” with a target system. This 
observation might be quite interesting, if applied to the current debate on scientific representation in 
the philosophy of science. The richness of this debate offered several answers to the constitution of 
model-systems informing scientific representation. Most of these answers, as far as I know, assume 
that this is a debate concerning the actuality, the possibility or the impossibility of a certain relation                                                         
1 Weyl believed that there is a physical process in nature that determines the success of the use of symmetry in physics 
in terms of prediction (see Weyl, 1952, p. 25). The perspective according to which symmetry works as a sort of 
regulative principle that will be supplemented by a deterministic theory via the development of physics has been 
endorsed by Wigner (1967). For a complete overview on this topic see Brading and Castellani (2003). 
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of correspondence between a model and the world, or between a model-system and a target-
system.2
An interesting example is offered by the “DDI” theory of representation of Hughes (1997), 
as underlined by Frigg (2010) also. Hughes identifies three elements pertaining scientific 
representation: elements of “denotation”, “demonstration”, and “interpretation”. Hughes suggested 
that “if we examine a theoretical model with these three activities in mind, we shall achieve some 
insight into the kind of representation that it provides” (Hughes 1997, pp. 329; 335). The present 
perspective, as far as what I call “practical functions” of scientific representative practices are 
concerned, is close to Hughes’ suggestion. The problem thus concerns how we represent something, 
namely what counts in the present approach are the activities and the functions that we associate to 
the aims of modeling phenomena.  
  
Another claim underlying my analysis has been expounded by Callender and Cohen (2006), 
namely that while there is no special problem about scientific representation, there is a general 
question involving representation or, in our case, representative practice, be it scientific or artistic. 
However, as we shall see, Callender and Cohen still share the same view advanced by the 
prominent participants to the mainstream debate: they are still endorsing a view according to which 
representation is a relation or involves correspondence. Also they maintain that this is grounded on 
arbitrary stipulation, even if they rightly proposed not to treat representation per se.3 On the 
contrary, I maintain that the distinction between art and science does not rely on the operations in 
themselves, rather on the way in which they are performed according to the aims we relate to them: 
geometrical symmetry, for instance, can be used in scientific practices and in art as well.4
Specifically, sciences are directed towards explicit or implicit aims, most of the time 
subordinated to the interests of political and economical institutions (both in the public and in the 
private sector). Nevertheless it would be far from a mere epistemological perspective to highlight 
the tasks linked to these interests. The question that should be raised here is the fact that due to this 
inevitable commitment to the social sphere and to the necessity of manipulation and control, 
scientific representative practices employ models that add something more to the model-
descriptions.  
 Albeit 
distinguished, art and sciences pertain to the same domain as being products of human social 
activities, and both scientists and artists interact, in very different ways, with the institutions.  
As Frigg (2010) argued “model-descriptions usually only specify a handful of essential 
properties, but it is understood that the model-system has properties other than the ones mentioned 
in the description. Model-systems are interesting exactly because more is true of them than what the                                                         
2 Within the debate on scientific representation, models received special attention. Giere claims that there is a 
“similarity” between a model and the world (Giere 1988, p. 81), depending on the intentions in designing and the use of 
the model performed by scientists (Giere 1992, pp. 122-123). Another claim is advanced by S. French who identifies 
the relationship between model and the real world as partial isomorphism (French 2002). Other introduced the 
normative aspects in dealing with representation (Morrison 2006) and pointed out that the representational and 
explanatory features of models are interconnected (Morrison and Morgan 1999). 
3 See Callender and Cohen (2006, p. 15): “In particular, we propose that the varied representational vehicles used in 
scientific settings (models, equations, toothpick constructions, drawings, etc.) represent their targets (the behavior of 
ideal gases, quantum state evolutions, bridges) by virtue of the mental states of their makers/users. For example, the 
drawing represents the bridge because the maker of the drawing stipulates that it does, and intends to activate in his 
audience (consumers of the representational vehicle, including possibly himself) the belief that it does”. The weakness 
of this point is highlighted by Frigg (2010). 
4 But it is unlikely that an artist uses Maxwell’s equations or tensor calculus in her representative practice. Why? The 
difference between these representative practices seems to concern different functions and the different aims and 
purposes that accompany the choice of the way in which we “represent” a phenomenon. 
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initial description specifies; no one would spend time studying model systems if all there was to 
know about them was the explicit content of the initial description. It is, for instance, true that the 
Newtonian model-system representing the solar system is stable and that the model-earth moves in 
an elliptic orbit; but none of this is part of the explicit content of the model-system’s original 
specification”.5
I add the observation here that this difference in instantiation between model-descriptions 
and model-systems depends on the aims attributed to the latter that are linked to concrete 
applications and to the aims of scientific representative practices in the human social organization 
(this is quite evident in the case of engineering practices or research in nanotechnology). It is 
undeniable that there is a strong link between our models and scientific theories that are 
produced by complex activities and our social practices, namely the fields and different activities 
in which we exert our knowledge, we acquire skills, we make experience and we set up the 
advancements for future development and research. Sciences are thus related to applications that 
transform the organization of our lives in the society. 
 
Secondly, I would add that different ways of representing phenomena in sciences (but this 
holds in art as well) can share common characteristics, as the studies of Stegeman (1969), 
Callender and Craig (2006), and Frigg (2010) show. On the other hand, in my view, these 
representative practices also differ according to the different aims that are, so to speak, attached to 
the operations performed in their domains: the use of the model-system counts to mark this 
difference. This basic observation holds within the same scientific domain also. For instance, it is 
widely acknowledged that same phenomena can be ‘represented’, or better, modeled, in a different 
way by the engineer and the physicist (see section III example 4, when the engineering model is 
insufficient to fit the aims of the target-system, engineers appeal to physical model-systems).  
But the same phenomenon can be described or explained on the ground of different models, 
depending on the chosen aims. For example, in the case of a bridge one can perform the analysis 
concerning lateral and vertical vibrations on the ground of a numerical model. Engineers can do it, 
by endorsing a prescriptive or a performance-based approach or both of them: the design can then 
proceed via models that are empirically informed, by taking into account human behavior 
interacting with a structure, or via the application of physical or biological models that show, as a 
result, the behavior analogous to the processes of interest. Scientists from different fields also 
propose different considerations of causal laws, for instance, because of the use of a scientific 
model that they chose to endorse. Same laws assume or lose relevance depending on the context in 
which they are used and produce a representation of the processes at stake directed towards certain 
aims (again see section III example 4, where from the virtual works principle descend two 
completely different models of physical systems and engineering models in the FEM, with 
inevitable consequences on the ‘representation’ of the target system). 
 
 
Now, this kind of observations, however, could lead to the suspicion that philosophy cannot 
be helpful in reading these processes and practices. Even worse would be the case if we endorse 
relativism or dogmatic skepticism in face of these reflections. 
I suggest an attempt to solve the difficulties at stake here and dissolve this suspicion. To 
restrict the domain of my enquiry, I shall focus on the specific case of the concept of scientific 
representation. This offers the chance to ask two main questions: 1. What are the possible                                                         
5 Frigg (2010, p. 102). 
 5 
ingredients of scientific reasoning and scientific representation? 2. What are the ways in which we 
produce and/or reproduce our scientific knowledge and representative practices?  
I am interested in the second aspect rather than in the first attempt, which is related to a 
metaphysics and that I call ‘the static approach’ to scientific representation. We should start 
considering the idea of abandoning what I call a ‘static’ idea of representation. This is a 
philosophical point that is quite important in my view.  
In what follows I propose the ‘dynamical approach’ to scientific representation, according to 
which principles and rules of certain processes are chosen according to aims, objectives, and criteria 
of unification that select and inform the unity (or a specific type of unity among many other 
possible) of the processes under analysis, even if they are just an approximation of the processes (be 
these processes the target-system or actual physical phenomena). 
The current debate on scientific representation and idealization follows upon one of the most 
intricate philosophical questions, namely the possibility of any correspondence between thought and 
reality, and truth and reality. Even if the terms of the debate focus on data, models and scientific 
theories, the question of the possible relationship among them and its justification is far from being 
solved and is still drawn in terms of correspondence, no matter whether it is complete, incomplete 
or impossible (to these three terms we can refer the realist, antirealist and skeptic positions). 
The history of philosophy might help us in this case. It is not by chance that for modern 
philosophy, from Descartes onwards, the term “representation” and its definition played a crucial 
role. By the end of the Seventeenth Century, representation had become a fundamental problem in 
epistemology, in natural philosophy, and in mathematics. In each of these fields, we can identify 
crucial topics that re-emerge in the subsequent development of philosophy of science and 
epistemology. In 1780s Immanuel Kant tried to undermine the problem, by establishing that 
representation is a ‘general mark’ in logical terms: it is so general and vague that the problem of a 
theory of knowledge should concentrate rather on the operations of the mind and forget about the 
correspondence-theory problem involving the mere concept of representation (Vorstellung, 
repraesentatio). Correspondence is a result of a complex process of manipulation, unification and 
acquisition, rather than an assumption, and the mere concept of representation does not explain the 
dynamics of this process. 
However, philosophy seems unable to resist the temptation of reflecting upon the concept of 
representation per se and to assume its relation with a theory of correspondence (or non-
correspondence). For instance, Frigg defines representation as follows: “Representation then is the 
relation between a model-system and its target-system”.6 He follows upon Callender and Cohen 
when he says that “It has been pointed out variously—and in my view correctly—that, in principle, 
anything can be a representation of anything else”.7
So at present, if the reader allows this analogy, we are facing more or less the same problem 
faced at the end of the Eighteenth Century: the re-definition of the concept of representation and 
correspondence. The concept of representation is one of those concepts that we cannot easily 
abandon, because it offered a rich source for reflection and invested the crucial epistemological 
problem of correspondence that engaged philosophers in the last four hundred years.  
  
However, if we change the conception of representation and correspondence underlying the 
studies on scientific representation, we might find that, even in the case of one of the most debated 
cases, the one of symmetry, our enquiry can throw a fresh light on it. 
                                                         
6 Frigg (2010, p. 99). 
7 Frigg (2010, p. 99). 
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Part II: Symmetry in context 
 
In this section I make use of symmetry as a case study in order to show how philosophy can 
fruitfully interact with sciences, especially when exploring the implications of the use of 
symmetries in different sciences. Weyl conceived of symmetry in the following terms: 
 
“As far as I can see, all a priori statements in physics have their origin in symmetry”.8
 
 
According to Weyl, it is possible to identify symmetry with the basis of a priori statements 
in physics. What does it mean? I cannot concentrate here on Weyl’s conception of a priori, but I 
suggest that he is using the term a priori in Kantian terms, namely, for him, the structure of our 
statement in physics lies on an a priori rule, symmetry, and this rule is not taken from experience, 
but it is mathematically constructed: it is an operation. Those who believe that models are set-
theoretic structures identified symmetry with a property of the relation or the structure.9 For them, 
models are structures, namely they are composed mathematical or set-theoretic entities in which 
what counts are the relations whose properties derive from reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry and so 
forth. I shall present now an alternative way of dealing with symmetry and scientific representation, 
alternative to French and Ladyman’s at least.10
If we look at the practical implications of scientific representation, namely if we consider the 
dynamics at stake in scientific representative practices that employ different kinds of symmetries, 
we find that the aims are so to speak incorporated into the model system, which is not constituted 
by simple extensionally defined relations (see example B and section III example 4).
 
11
                                                        
8 (Weyl, 1952 p. 126). 
 The second 
point that the structuralist approach misses is that symmetry (a part from its mathematical 
formulation confined within its definition of automorphism) is not a relation that can be referred to 
objects neither directly or indirectly without including properties that pertain to the specific system 
under analysis and that in some cases takes into account the material properties of the objects, but 
also human behavior (as it is in the case of the performance-based approach and risk analysis of 
structures in civil engineering). Moreover, as we shall see in this section, symmetry appears more as 
an operation at stake in scientific representative practices, and it does not exhaust the activity of 
modeling systems and processes. I shall start with examples of symmetries in geometrical objects 
9  Van Fraassen (1980), Da Costa and French (1990). 
10 I follow here Frigg´s criticism: “This definition of isomorphism brings a predicament to the fore: an isomorphism 
holds between two structures and not between a structure and a part of the world per se. In order to make sense of the 
notion that there is an isomorphism between a model-system and its target-system, we have to assume that the target 
exemplifies a particular structure. The problem is that this cannot be had without bringing nonstructural features into 
play”. This point is clearly shown in the case of engineering model-systems, where even the material of the structure 
(i.e. wood, steal etc.) and the shape of the structural elements play a crucial role in modeling. 
11 I endorse here once again Frigg’s criticism of this view: “For what follows it is important to be clear on what we 
mean by “individual” and “relation” in this context. To define the domain of a structure it does not matter what the 
individuals are—they may be whatever. The only thing that matters from a structural point of view is that there are so 
and so many of them. Or to put it another way, all we need is dummies or placeholders. Relations are understood in a 
similarly “deflationary” way. It is not important what the relation “in itself” is; all that matters is between which objects 
it holds. For this reason, a relation is specified purely extensionally, that is, as class of ordered n-tuples and the relation 
is assumed to be nothing over and above this class of ordered tuples. Thus understood, relations have no properties 
other than those that derive from this extensional characterization, such as transitivity, reflexivity, symmetry, etc. This 
leaves us with a notion of structure containing dummy-objects between which purely extensionally defined relations 
hold”. 
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and their possible use in chemistry. These three examples are taken from Gerard ‘t Hooft’s lectures 
held at the University of Utrecht in 2008.12
 
 
A- Examples of symmetries in geometrical objects are given by symmetries of 
transformations as rotations and reflections that leave geometric objects invariant. Symmetries of 
geometric objects are relevant in sciences, as shown in the case of a molecule with tetrahedrical 
symmetry. The CH 4  (methane molecule) has the form of a tetrahedron and the symmetry of the 
molecule usually determines some of the physical and chemical properties of the substance (for 
example the band structure that it shows in Infrared and Raman spectroscopy).13
We infer that if a molecule possesses inversion symmetry (there is a 
point 
  
→
p such that the molecule is invariant under 
→→→
− xpx 2 ), this 
cannot have an electric dipole moment. In this case we define 
invariance and an actual property, by acquiring a 
correspondence between what we can find in 
nature and the rules of symmetry that we follow in 
order to be oriented in practical experience. The 
aim associated with this practical function is to manipulate and to classify 
physical bodies for further tasks and applications. 
 
 
B- Transformations of space and time that leave the equations of motion invariant 
constitute another example that is extremely helpful to show that we incorporate aims in scientific 
representative practices. For Newtonian physics these symmetries are the transformations forming 
the Galilei group, which is a 10 dimensional Lie Group: 
 
1) 0
→→→
+ xxx    spatial translations 
2) 0ttt + t   time translations 
3) tvxx 0
→→→
+  relative movement at constant velocity 
4) 
→→
xRx 0    spatial rotations 
 
These symmetries are extremely relevant in physics, because we associate the aim of 
finding conserved quantities to the symmetries of the equations of motion, according to a practical 
function of prediction. For relativistic physics the equations are invariant under Lorentz 
transformations (which also are a 10 dimensional Lie Group). The translations and rotations act the 
same way as in the Galilei group; however, the transformations that relate reference systems that are 
moving with constant velocity relative to each other act differently. Consider the equation: 
 
 
  
                                                         
12 http://www.phys.uu.nl/~sahlmann/teaching/lecture%20notes/discrete%20groups%20lecture%20notes.pdf. 
13 Coates (2000, pp. 10815–10837). 
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By assuming that Lorentz invariance is a fundamental symmetry of nature, then the form 
that the equations of motion for the various matter fields and forces can take is severely restricted. 
The practical function of prediction operates here in synergy with the practical function of 
restriction (see example C). Furthermore, we can detect the practical function of prediction, by 
considering Noether’s Theorem, which establishes that if in a theory there is a continuous n-
parameter family of symmetries, then there are n conserved quantities. If the equations of motion 
for a field are invariant under time translations, there is a conserved energy density for this field. 
The scientific representative practice at stake here is one of the most relevant for studies in physics 
and is directly linked to the practical function of prediction that we attribute to scientific theories 
and models. 
 
C- Gauge symmetries that leave local equations of motion invariant are restrictive in terms 
of the equations of motion that they allow. Gauge symmetry plays a crucial role in the foundation of 
the Standard Model, given that the fundamental interactions (electromagnetic, weak and strong) are 
symmetric under a certain gauge symmetry: gauge symmetry dictates the form of the interactions 
and in doing so it allows to perform the practical function of restricting the equation of motion to 
be used in a certain scientific theory and in model-systems. Also it allows us to construct a system 
of interaction to classify phenomena at high energy scales. 
Before going on to Part III, it must be noticed that in scientific representative practices three 
practical functions emerge from these examples: 
 
In case A we have the dominance of the function of invariance: we generally attribute 
objectivity to this function in order to define properties of the processes under analysis, classify 
and manipulate them for further aims.14
In case B we have the dominance of the function of prediction: symmetry is of a 
fundamental import in order to 1) find conserved quantities of a system independently from its 
degree of complexity, and 2) incorporate phenomena into a system via implemented classification 
(see case C). 
 
In case C we have the dominance of the practical function of restriction: symmetry allows 
the selection of necessary rules and principles to be used for further tasks within the framework of 
a specific theory and at the same time it informs its systematic and unified character. 
 
For each of these functions there are aims directly linked to the use of symmetry in different 
sciences. The aims I illustrated accompany our scientific representation in practice and every 
scientific enterprise. These consist in: 
 
-Definition of properties 
-Classification 
-Manipulation 
-Finding of conserved quantities 
-Selection of necessary rules 
 
                                                        
14 Note that symmetry is not to be completely identified with invariance as pointed out by Roman (2004, p. 6). 
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The next step shows that these aims are not at all arbitrary, but respond to necessary tasks of 
scientific practices that profoundly influence the organization of our life once they are applied to 
specific fields. 
 
Part III: Symmetry and scientific representative practices 
 
In this last section on symmetry, I shall refer to examples that highlight the employment of 
symmetries in different fields as aim-directed scientific representative practices. The most 
interesting case in terms of applicability of symmetries concerns geometrical symmetries of 
rotations, translations and reflections directed towards invariance, classification and prediction. The 
best known examples of these symmetries are taken from crystallography, chemistry, and biology. 
The last example concerns engineering models. 
 
1. Snowflakes and Crystals 
 
In this first example, the practical function of classification is clearly displayed by using 
geometrical symmetry in modeling snowflakes and crystals. The symmetry is “injected” in physical 
bodies to easily compare them with other samples. However, as shown in the X-ray and atomic 
force diagrams, geometrical symmetry allows an approximation, not a pure correspondence 
between the model and the physical object. This idealization is directed towards aims of 
comparison, classification and intervention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Lie Groups – Hydrogen Atom 
 
In the specific case of the hydrogen atom, scientists insert operators to render it symmetrical in both 
the relativistic and non-relativistic case for the purpose of prediction and explanation. This aspect is 
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clearly pointed out by S. Singer.15
 
 Her analysis focuses on how to 
make predictions about the numbers of each kind of basic state of 
a quantum system from only two ingredients: the symmetry and 
linear model of quantum mechanics. This method has wide 
applications in crystallography, atomic structure, classification of 
manifolds with symmetry and other fields. Also, as shown by S. J. 
Weinberg (2011), it is possible to generate SO(4) symmetry from 
Lie algebra in the methods for analyzing the hydrogen atom. 
Through the use of dynamical symmetry scientists provided a new 
approach to the “accidental degeneracy” of the hydrogen atoms energy levels and explained it. 
Further applications of this model in physics can be found in Vibron Model Description of 
molecules, the Interacting Boson Model of the Atomic Nucleus, the SU(3) classification of hadrons, 
and the Bose–Einstein condensates of spinor and tensor bosons. The hydrogen atom model inspires 
current studies in genetics and biology, as we shall see in the next example. 
3. The DNA Structure (Helical Symmetry) 
 
The reason why we use helical symmetry in modeling DNA structure has obvious practical 
implications in terms of description of the processes of its replication in order to intervene and 
manipulate them. As the pictures show, we can perform dodecahedral rotation or privilege the axial 
view of DNA double helix, according to the aim of intervening on it and easily identify the 
processes of a certain interest in simulations and test. As R. Sinden (1994) argued, two-dimensional 
and three-dimensional nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) data of DNA in solution provided three-
dimensional coordinates for the position of individual atoms in DNA, with the result that the picture 
that emerges is one of an extremely variable helical structure, not at all uniform and monotonous. 
Furthermore, the secondary structure of DNA can assume myriad alternative or non-B-DNA forms 
(which are the most common models used since 1960s and derived from X-ray diffraction 
analysis).16
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 Singer (2005, pp. 283-296). 
16 Sinden (1994, pp. 3; 32). 
 11 
The classical model is de facto insufficient when the evolution of the genetic code is considered. In 
genetics, scientists prefer to employ a pseudo-orthogonal (Lorentz like) symmetry in stochastic 
modeling, in order to ‘represent’ a genetic network. In this way, models of gene expression are 
linked to the practical function of prediction of processes involved in the secondary structure of 
DNA. This practical function was weakened in the classical model. Rather, as I claimed in the 
previous example, the study of the energy levels of hydrogen atoms played a crucial role in 
developing models analogically applied to genetics. Also scientists may refer to an algebraic 
approach in modeling the evolution of the genetic code: a current code is generated by a dynamical 
symmetry breaking process, starting out from an initial state of complete symmetry and ending in 
the observed final state of low symmetry. In both cases, symmetry plays a decisive role: in the first 
case, it is a characteristic (invariant) feature of the dynamics of the gene switch and its decay to 
equilibrium, whereas in the second, it provides the guidelines for the evolution of the coding.17
 
 Also 
it is possible to identify the three practical functions (invariance, prediction, and restriction) 
associated to the use of symmetry in scientific representative practices. The following passage 
clarifies these aspects and we can detect in the scientists’ words the operations they performed, 
according to the practical functions and the aims associated to their practice: 
“The notion of degeneracy is profoundly related to that of symmetry. Degeneracy means invariance; in the 
present case, it means that the codon to amino acid assignment is invariant under the replacement of codons 
by synonymous ones. And invariance means symmetry, in the sense that one can build transformation groups 
that keep invariant certain properties. This kind of connection between symmetry and invariance can be seen 
in the spectrum of the hydrogen atom: this is a system with an obvious rotational symmetry, implying that 
states with the same azimuthal angular momentum quantum number m will have the same energy. But 
symmetries may be much less obvious than in this case; they may be hidden! And there are many examples 
where the spectrum of a molecule or atom is a testimony of some hidden symmetry. Thus if we look at the 
genetic code from this point of view, as if it were some kind of spectrum, we face a straightforward 
question: is the degeneracy pattern of the code the expression of some hidden symmetry? This promptly 
suggested performing what we may call ‘the search for symmetries in the genetic code’. […] Lie group 
theory provides a well-developed mathematical machinery for modelling symmetry in biological 
systems. It provides not only a quantitative framework but also leads to biological insights about the 
processes that are modelled, as shown by the examples presented in this review. In the stochastic model 
for a two-state gene, symmetry has practical implications: the eigenvalue of the diagonal operator 
characterises the dynamics of the gene switch and the affinity between the regulatory protein and the gene 
operator site, whereas the non-diagonal operators connect the probability distributions of the two states. In 
addition, noise analysis leads to the conclusion that fast switching genes give rise to Poissonian distributions 
whereas slowly switching genes have broader or bi-peaked distributions. In the algebraic model for the 
evolution of the genetic code, possible pathways for this evolution arise naturally, but are strongly 
restricted. The picture of evolution by a stepwise incorporation of new amino acids fits perfectly with 
that of dynamical symmetry breaking. The Klein symmetry that has remained preserved can serve as an 
underlying principle that has conducted the evolution of the standard code as well as that of non-standard 
codes. In the modelling of gene networks, group theoretical tools can be useful for the search for a 
composition rule between two or more genes. Another feature is the possibility to model single genes that 
present more than two levels of regulation. The construction of a dynamical system for the evolution of 
the genetic code is also a possible future application of group theoretical methods in biology”.18
 
 
                                                        
17 See Ramos, Innocentini, Forger, Hornos (2010). 
18 Ramos, Innocentini, Forger, Homos (2010). 
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As it appears from this passage, we cannot detach a model system from its specific use. Also as I 
have previously pointed out, what we call “correspondence” in representing phenomena is nothing 
else but a process of fitting aims of scientific representative practices. In view of these aims 
scientists analogically construct the unity of the processes under analysis. This definition seems to 
be valid for model systems both referred to target-systems and phenomena. 
 
4. Symmetry in Engineering Modeling: FEM 
 
I shall introduce now symmetry used in the Finite element method (FEM) in order to show the 
limitations of the structuralist account of models. The FEM is a technique originally developed for 
numerical solution of complex problems in structural mechanics, and it remains the method of 
choice for complex systems. In the FEM, the structural system is modeled by a set of finite 
elements connected at points (or nodes). Elements may have physical properties, such as 
thickness, coefficient of thermal expansion, density, Young’s modulus, shear modulus and 
Poisson’s ratio. It is also possible to model straight or curved one-dimensional elements with 
physical properties such as axial, bending, and 
torsional stiffness. In engineering the use of this kind 
of elements aims at modeling the behavior of cables, 
braces, trusses, beams, stiffeners, grids and frames that 
in turn can be parts of more complex structures. The 
elements are positioned at the centroidal axis of the 
actual members. The picture shows that via axial 
symmetry only half of this resonator has been modeled. 
By reducing the number of elements the analysis time 
is significantly reduced, as well as the costs. There is 
clearly a utilitarian function attributed to geometrical 
symmetry here. Indeed, the introduction of FEM has 
substantially decreased the time to take products to the 
production line. Through improved initial prototype 
designs using FEM testing and development have been 
accelerated and productivity increased. 
But what is really intriguing for the present perspective is that certain elements properties in the 
FEM must be part of or coincide with the model-systems: this represents a challenge to French’s 
account of models as structures. If we have to account, for instance, for gusset plates buckling we 
appeal to the FEM. Now, in French’s view, the numerical model would be isomorphically mapped 
into the FEM. But in the FEM there is more than the mathematical model, which appears to be 
rather the basis for the prediction of the behavior of the element which is modeled in the FEM. 
Furthermore, the mathematical model does not entail the exact relationships of displacement 
modeled to account for the actual buckling of a gusset plate (it must include, for instance, thermal 
coefficients depending on the material and the shape of the gusset plate). In the FEM the elements 
properties determine the models, for example, when two-dimensional elements have to capture 
membrane action (plane stress, plane strain) and/or bending action (plates and shells). They can also 
have a variety of shapes (flat or curved triangles and quadrilaterals). Nodes are usually placed at the 
element corners and additional nodes can be placed along the element edges or even inside the 
element. The elements are positioned at the mid-surface of the actual layer thickness, and to do 
so, one does not rely on the mathematical model only. This is the case also for torus-shaped 
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elements used to solve axis-symmetric problems, such as thin, thick plates, shells, and solids that 
may have cross-sections similar to the previously described types. Now, the behavior of nodes is 
modeled according to nodal (vector) displacements or degrees of freedom, which may include 
translations, rotations, and for special applications, higher order derivatives of displacements. But 
these model-systems include more than these relations and ‘structures’. 
Model-systems including these elements follow upon symmetry or asymmetry conditions that are 
exploited in order to restrict the size of the domain. In this way, displacement compatibility is 
ensured at the nodes, and preferably, along the element edges as well, particularly when adjacent 
elements are of different types, material or thickness. Compatibility of displacements of many 
nodes can usually be imposed via constraint relations imposed to nodes on symmetry axes, and 
when it is not feasible, a physical model that imposes the constraints may be used instead. In the 
model-systems the elements’ behaviors capture the dominant actions of the actual system, by 
adding something more (elements’ shape, empirical constraints, and so forth) to the mathematical 
model.  
FEM has radically improved both the standard of engineering designs and the methodology of the 
design process in many applications. For example, in spice-compatible circuits and system 
simulators, it can be used a combination of analytic and numerical approaches in the FEM that 
generates other models to consider more complicated effects. In “Behavioural modeling for 
heterogeneous systems based on FEM descriptions”, J. Haase, S. Reitz, and P. Schwarz have shown 
that model-description are incorporated into model-systems to fit and predict the behavior of a 
certain structure. The interaction of these models into one model-system is determined by the laws 
at stake (in the specific case, a generalization of Kirchhoff’s Current Law) that regulate the unity of 
the process under analysis. The method of incorporation of two or more model-descriptions 
into one model-system allows the usage of analytical FEM formulas for the construction of 
behavioral models, to derive behavioral models with fixed numerical values for components from 
FEM descriptions, and the implementation of models in different languages (MAST, HDL-A, 
VHDL-AMS). This methodology employed in scientific representative practices, although is not 
immediately related to symmetry, encompasses it in the FEM. Moreover, it confirms that the use of 
a model (be it a model-description or a model-system) makes the difference in scientific practices 
for the definition of the models-system itself that should account for complex actual processes.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Why and how do we use symmetry in representing? It appears that we use symmetries in our 
scientific practices and we perform them according to practical functions of invariance, prediction, 
and restriction in order to control and further manipulate models and their associated phenomena. 
We intervene and manipulate certain processes according to an order that is dictated and controlled 
by functions, operators etc., so that we can predict part of the behavior of a structure under certain 
transformations that leave it invariant. But given that models include the operations of our scientific 
representative practices, they also include the practical functions and the associated aims that 
inform the model-systems. It does not mean, however, that a physical object is the product of a 
mere arbitrary construction, nor that model-systems are just structures. It is rather evident that when 
we adopt certain representative practices in sciences, particularly by using symmetry (or 
asymmetry) in modeling, we are pursuing certain specific aims depending on the functions of 
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invariance,19
For this reason I cannot agree with Frigg on that “the intrinsic nature of a model-system does not 
depend on whether or not it is so used: representation is extrinsic to the medium doing the 
representing”.
 prediction and restriction. Representing in science is never unrelated to aims and 
sciences, especially in their applications and problem solving contexts reveal this crucial aspect. 
20
From the present perspective, in the case of symmetry there is something more to be added 
to our conception of representation, especially scientific representation. The latter cannot be read in 
terms of correspondence or relation simply. The mere use of the term ‘representation’ is ambiguous, 
because it prevents us from seeing the dynamics underlying scientific processes and from 
explaining the fact that we use specific scientific tools to predict and anticipate phenomena, whose 
unitary process is incorporated and captured by the model-systems.  
 We have seen how the dynamical approach to the question of scientific 
representation allows us to deal with crucial elements that are disregarded by current interpretations.  
The concept of representative practices is an ideal substitute for the concept of scientific 
representation, because it focuses on the way in which we order and restrict data, laws and 
phenomena, not only in a descriptive, but also in an explanatory way. A desirable account of 
scientific representative practices looks at the purposes that we may inject into models via the 
performance of practical functions. In the specific context of this paper, I have shown that to 
expound the reasons why we use symmetries in sciences means to deal with a certain conception of 
objectivity as invariance (see Part II, example A), and, according to the proposed view, the question 
of objectivity can be inserted in the context of a dynamical approach to representative practices. 
Objectivity is linked to practical functions and aims of scientific representative practices: the more 
the results of a model-system fit the aims at stake (such as explaining the failure of a bridge or the 
replication of DNA by comparing two double-helix structures), the more the operations and 
functions they are attached to acquire objectivity. Objectivity ceases to be read in terms of 
correspondence and becomes a process that includes the operations we perform and their aims. 
The concept of representative practices certainly tells us that we look at the fixed properties, 
primary properties as relations of invariance of/in a certain system, but also that this is not the 
whole story. If we were happy with this perspective only, we would not be able to identify the vast 
range of functions of symmetry in sciences. On the contrary, as I tried to show, it is with the 
identification of other crucial practical functions and the aims that we associate to models that we 
can give a more satisfactory account of scientific practices,21
                                                        
19 Though, as I tried to show, there is not a perfect correspondence between symmetry and invariance. 
 and then throw a fresh light on the use 
of symmetries in sciences. Conclusively, scientific representative practices (that refer to something 
more than a mere mapping or performance of isomorphism) are conceived as of aim-directed 
processes of ordering phenomena or laws according to a chosen rule that must respond at least to 
one of the three abovementioned functions: invariance, prediction, and restriction. Although it is far 
20 Frigg (2010, p. 99). Frigg’s perspective is closer to what I called the ‘static approach’ to scientific representation, 
dealing with the “intrinsic nature” of model-systems and the ingredients of scientific representation. The disagreement 
does not concern his arguments, which I find consistent with his perspective, but rather it is due to the different project I 
propose.  
21 Furthermore to investigate these practices from a dynamical perspective means to analyze the relationship between 
scientific and artistic representative practices also, because they depend on the same ground: human social activity. In 
scientific representative practices we relate the operation of symmetries to images, to visualization, qualitative and 
material properties, as it is in the case of lattices, molecule models, snowflakes etc. Now, these ‘representations’ turn 
out to be beautiful as well. As Weyl remarked, we represent something for scientific purposes, but it turns out to be part 
of another representative approach, or better representative practice, which pertains to art. We have still to explain why 
and how this is possible. 
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from being complete, the proposed approach to scientific representative practices is different from 
other alternatives because it ties together the practical functions and the aims associated to the 
processes of acquisition of the correspondence between model-descriptions, model-systems, target-
systems and the actual processes or structures. Further discussion concerns the ground of the 
agreement on the use of certain models and the interpretations of different results descending from 
scientific practices. And more importantly, the present approach perhaps entails the possibility of 
re-defining or abandoning the concept of correspondence in the current debate on scientific 
representation. But this is another question that deserves further discussion. 
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